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OIL POLLUTION AND THE COASTAL STATE
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Marine oil pollution is a global problem of tremendously
complex nature involving complicated interaction of many
economic, scientific, technologicaY, political and legal fac-
tors. No single aspect may be successfully treated in isola-
tion.
There is little doubt concerning the relative amount of
oceanic oil pollution that is currently occurring. Several
recent authoritative national and international studies have
estimated oil pollution from oil transportation activities
alone is in excess of one million metric tons each year. l
The annual estimate of oil discharged by all ocean-oriented
petroleum operations is 1.5 to 2 million metric tons. 2 There
is considerable argument as to the exact nature and magnitude
of oil pollution effects on the marine environment. However
the possible effects are serious and no responsible entity
argues that efforts to prevent oil pollution should wait until
a definitive understanding is acquired concerning all the un-
desirable results of such marine pollution.
Although I have already postulated that no single aspect
of marine oil pollution can be successfully treated in complete
isolation, it is, for practical reasons, necessary to limit
1
the scope of this research effort. The boundaries established
are not absolute and the question posed will be such as to
allow or stimulate consideration of many of the economic, tech-
nological and legal aspects previously mentioned.
It will be the purpose of this paper to pose and answer
this question. . How has the legal competence of a coastal
state been strengthened with respect to that state's ability
to prevent marine oil pollution? The question by implication
presupposes that a certain change in legal competence is in
fact occurring. The legal and historical baseline from which
to gauge this gradual change will be established by reviewing
past milestones in oil pollution law. A closer examination
will then be made of recent evolutionary changes in both inter-
national and national oil pollution law subsequent to the
Torrey Canyon Disaster of 1967. The very global nature of
marine oil pollution predicates eventual conflict between
national interests and existing international law. Even though
the exact width of the territorial sea is as yet not estab-
lished, the ubiquitous, all pervasive nature of oceanic oil
pollution makes it a poor observer of man made boundaries and
a difficult subject for man made laws as well.
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CHAPTER II
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
At 8:50 Saturday morning, 18 March 1967, the tanker
Torrey Canyon ran aground on Seven Stones Reef about 16 miles
west of Lands End, England. In addition to being a bonafide
navigational landmark, these Seven Stones proved to be a legal
milestone in the evolution of new marine oil pollution law.
The legal impact of this supertanker grounding and subsequent
oil pollution of massive scale brought home in dramatic fash-
ion the truly inadequate nature of existing international oil
pollution law. In a matter of days approximately 100,000 tons
of crude oil were released from the mortally damaged tanker
hu11. 1 This was the largest single oil spill in maritime his-
tory. The international nature of the problem was obvious.
The ship was owned by a Bermudian corporation registered in
Liberia under long-term charter to a U.S. company and sub-
chartered for that voyage to a British firm. The Master and
crew were Italian and a Dutch salvage company was later in-
volved. French and British property was extensively damaged
and both countries incurred tremendous expenses. Finally the
ship went aground in international waters. In such circum-
stances, who is responsible, who can take remedial action,
who pays the bill? Neither international or national law
could provide adequate answers to these and many other pertinent
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questions. Advances in technology frequently dictate changes
in the provisions of existing law but in general a major dis-
aster is required to generate the motive power of public
opinion needed to initiate substantive changes. To under-
stand the many and often controversial changes that occurred
in both international and national oil pollution law subsequent
to the Torrey Canyon incident, one must first have a reasonable
familiarity with the earlier development of marine oil pollu-
tion law.
Why is oil pollution a matter of international concern?
Because oil pollution is potentially harmful to many benefi-
cial uses of the oceans and its regulation affects man's his-
torical free use of the sea. We have recently reached that
How did we get to this
point in time where freedom of the seas is being challenged
because it is being interpreted by some as license to pollute
or at least to risk marine pollution.
point?
General concern for oceanic oil pollution appears to
have originated during the decade following World War T.
Both the United States and the League of Nations attempted to
obtain international agreement on means of preventing oceanic
oil pollution. 2 The United States enacted an Oil Pollution Act
in 1924 and two years later chaired an international conference
on oil pollution in Washington. This conference was the first
international effort to discuss the technical and legal problems
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of oil pollution in any detail. It resulted in the first
International Convention Relating to Oil Pollution which was
however never ratified by any participating nation. A similarly
unsuccessful effort was mounted in the League of Nations.
The many torpedoed and otherwise damaged tankers of the
U.S. Atlantic coast during World War II demonstrated the haz-
ards of oil pollution. The ever increasing need for petroleum
products in a burgeoning world economy further emphasized the
need for some form of international control. Little was accom-
plished until 1954 when the International Convention for the
Prevention of Oil Pollution was concluded in London. This
Convention became effective when ratified by the requisite
number of nations on 26 July 1958. It prohibits tankers and
other ships (with certain exemptions) from discharging oil or
oily mixtures within 50 miles of the nearest land or within
any of several 50 or 100 mile-wide geographic prohibited zones
delineated in Annex A of the Convention. Article III of this
Convention provided that any contravention of these prohibi-
tions "shall be an offense punishable under the laws of the
territory in which the ship is registered.,,3 Application or
enforcement of the original 1954 Convention is therefore left
strictly to the flag state of the offending ship.4 Many par-
ticipating countries including the U.S. were not satisfied
with this Convention and ratification was in some cases a slow
process. With certain reservations it was accepted by the U.S.
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Senate in May 1961 and with the enactment of Senate Bill 2187,
became the Oil Pollution Act of 1961. The U.S. reservation
concerned oil pollution offenses within its territorial waters
which the U.S. contended should still be subject to existing
U.S. law (Oil Pollution Act of 1924). Also the U.S. would not
be compelled to finance oily waste disposal facilities ashore
although it would urge port authorities and private contractors
to provide such facilities when existing capability was found
inadequate.
Although the 1954 Convention and subsequent national
implementing legislation had many failings, they did result
in the first mandatory shipboard record of oil and oily waste
disposal. The "Oil Record Book" specified in Annex B of the
Convention required a detailed accounting of all ballasting,
deballasting and cleaning of both cargo oil and bunker fuel
tanks. The record book was then to be signed by the officer
in charge of the operation being reported and the ships's Mas-
ter. The oil record book was to be made available to the
authorities of any contracting state when the ship in question
was within a port of that state. Violations of various provi-
sions of the Convention including false or inaccurate state-
ments in the oil record book could result in fines from $100
to $2500, revocation of license for ships' officers and up to
six months imprisonment. The 1954 Convention as adopted by
many signatory nations depended very heavily on these partici-
pating states for enforcement. There was little uniformity
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of fines or penalties and consequently little real uniformity
of enforcement on an international basis. The basic complaint
of coastal states was that this convention was heavily slanted
in favor of ship and cargo owners' interests and did consid-
erably less to protect the interests of the coastal state.
The law was corrective or remedial in nature and not really
preventive. Although the Convention was strengthened somewhat
by amendment in 1962, which provided a more realistic defini-
tion of oil pollution and extended some prohibited zones, the
law remains essentially ineffective in a preventive sense.
Even within the territorial waters enforcement by a coastal
state is fraught with many almost insurmountable difficulties.
Detection and proof of violation are a serious problem. It's
not that the coastal state lacks the authority to enforce the
law immediately adjacent to her coast. The 1958 Convention
on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone requires foreign
vessels exercising the right of innocent passage to comply
"with the laws and regulations enacted by the coastal state
in conformity with these articles and other rules of inter-
national law."S But unless the offending ship is caught in
the act of discharging oil within the territorial sea, it is
almost impossible to invoke the limited provisions of the Con-
vention. And what of oil discharged just outside the national
limits of a coastal state's jurisdiction? This is clearly a
matter for the flag state to take the required corrective
7
action if the damaged state has all the needed evidence.
Actual aerial photographs of a ship discharging oily waste
have in several cases not constituted sufficient evidence
because they were not accompanied by a sample of the liquid
retrieved in the ship's wake.* Both the 1954 Conference and
the amending Conference in 1962 recognized this problem of
enforcement and attached to their Convention a Resolution which
states in part • • "The only entirely effective method known
of preventing oil pollution is the complete avoidance of the
discharge of persistent oils into the sea and . . measures
are possible [now} which would enable this to be substantially
achieved. tt6
One must recognize that this discussion centers thus far
on prohibiting only intentional or inadvertent discharges of
oil and oily waste within certain geographic zones. For in-
stance oil released as a result of a marine casualty would
not be a violation of the 1954 Convention. The question of
pollution of the open ocean beyond national jurisdiction was
also considered in the 1958 Geneva Law of the Sea Conference.
Article 24 of the Convention on the High Seas provided that
"Every state shall draw up regulations to prevent pollution
of the seas by the discharge of oil by ships or pipe-lines or
*The Convention specifies that to be considered oily
waste, the oil content of the discharge must exceed 100 parts
per million.
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resulting from the exploitation of the sea bed and its subsoil
taking account of existing treaty provisions on the subject."
This then was the status of oil pollution law when the
Torrey Canyon grounded. The law simply did not anticipate
such a massive oil spill disaster, although several coastal
countries attempted earlier to deal with liability for open
ocean marine casualties. The overwhelming power and influence
of shipping and oil company interests had managed to delay
substantive liability legislation to govern international oil
pollution from either accidential or negligent causes.
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CHAPTER III
COASTAL STATE'S DILEMMA
Let's look more closely at the legal problem marine oil
pollution poses for the coastal state. What is it that dic-
tates a need for legal protection from marine oil pollution and
how may the coastal state achieve such protection? To acquire
legal protection one must have a legal complaint. The concept
and definition of marine pollution is certainly the starting
point needed as a basis for any anti-pollution legislation and
subsequent regulation enforcement. In the narrowest sense any
alteration of the natural quality of sea water would be marine
pollution, but this approach would remove one of the valuable
uses of the ocean, i.e., its quite useful assimulative capa-
bility. A more practical definition and one generally agreed
upon would be any measurable alteration of the marine environ-
ment (or sea water quality) which detrimentally alters any of
the products, resources or marine life beneficially used by
man. There are several compelling reasons for defining marine
pollution in terms of injury to the beneficial uses of the
marine environment. For our purposes the most pertinent of
pollution and has been the primary legal precedent for estab-
lishing the liability of one nation-state for causing injuriou
pollution (of air or water) to another state. The decision in
this case between the U.S. and Canada has been interpreted as
imposing a duty upon one nation to prevent injuries to the
beneficial uses of the air or water of a neighboring state. 2
Should the state move unilaterally to prevent harm to its
coastal environment or should it depend upon the evolution of
international law to take care of its national interests in
this regard? There has in recent years, particularly since
the Torrey Canyon incident, been great differences of national
legal opinion on this question. These differences have been
many and varied. Undeniably the slow rate at which effective
action has been taken internationally has favored unilateral
legislation. However, the biggest stumbling block to inter-
national progress in the formulation of effective marine
pollution law has been the dissatisfaction of the coastal stat
with the legal interpretation of the word liability itself.
The shipping and cargo-owning interests favor what is called
fault liability--that is, liability dependent on proving neg-
ligent responsibility or fault. The coastal interests claim
that proof of fault is not germane and that the ship or cargo-
owner (or both) are liable for oil spill damage no matter what
the cause, simply because the damage resulted from their actio
or ownership. Had the oil not been there in transhipment, no
11
damage could have resulted. This is termed Strict or Absolute
Liability. After the Torrey Canyon grounding it was widely
recognized that from the coastal state's viewpoint the amended
London Oil Pollution Convention of 1954 was almost totally
inadequate as to both scope and enforcement. A particularly
strong opinion was voiced by many coastal nations concerning
the need to allow the coastal state to take early action to
prevent oil pollution damage to their coasts when an oil spill
occurred outside of their territorial waters.
Shortly after the Torry Canyon grounded, British Prime
Minister Harold Wilson called upon the United Nations Inter-
governmental Maritime Consultive Organization (IMCO) to meet
in extraordinary session to consider possible changes in inter-
national maritime 1aw. 3 As a direct result of IMCO's study
the International Legal Conference on Marine Pollution Damage
was convened in Brussels on 10 November 1969 with 54 nations
represented. This Conference produced two significant new
Conventions on marine oil pollution: The International Con-
vention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of
Oil Pollution Casualties and the International Convention on
Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage. 4 These Conventions
attempted to address two basic inadequacies of existing law:
How to cope with an oil pollution threat that originates in
international waters and how to establish liability and pro-
vide funding to redress oil pollution damage.
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The first convention mentioned, commonly referred to as
the "Intervention Convention", allows any state following a
maritime casualty on the high seas to take such action as may
be necessary to prevent, mitigate or eliminate grave or immin-
ent danger to their coastline or related interests from po11u-
tion or the threat of pollution of the sea by oil. This
convention further allows a coastal state to take any action
proportionate to the pollution damage, actual or threatened,
including the complete destruction of the oil tanker and or
its cargo. 5
The second convention, known as the "Liability Convention,"
provides that the owner of a tanker is liable for any pollution
damage caused to a coastal state by oil discharged from his
ship. Under this convention, the tanker owner may limit his
liability for any single incident to $134.00 for each ton of
ship's cargo oil capacity not to exceed 14 million dollars.
Any tanker owner subject to this convention (18 countries signed
it originally) and whose ship carries more than two thousand ton
of cargo oil must maintain insurance or an equivalent fund equal
to the limit of his convention liability.
Both of these conventions, when they enter into force,
forma11Y,wi11 provide fairly powerful tools to prevent or re-
dress oil pollution damage to the coastal state. Yet there
are several coastal states which are less than satisfied with
the results of the 1969 Brussels Conference.
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Possibly the most vocal and surely the most dramatic
objection to these recent conventions has come from Canada.
It is instructive to examine both Canada's objections and her
unilateral legal actions to determine their validity and
rationale. It is particularly pertinent from a u.s. viewpoint
to understand our neighbor's actions since the U.S. maintains
that Canada's unilateral extension of jurisdiction is an un-
acceptable infringement of the freedom of the seas. 6
As a participant in the 1969 Brussels Conference, Canada
strongly advocated a liability convention which would provide
for absolute liability, compulsory insurance, and a pollution
damage fund based on tanker deadweight tonnage. Canada add i-
tionally proposed that the ship owner be liable to a fixed
amount for pollution damage beyond which the cargo owner would
be held liable if damages had not been adequately covered. 7
The conference was deadlocked between those that favored fault
liability and those that advocated absolute liability and a
compromise resulted. This compromise called for a form of
strict liability but with several critical exceptions. In the
Canadian view, it amounted to fault liability with the burden
of proof falling on the ship owner to cover the exceptions.
When the marine accident does not fall within the several
exceptions the ship owner is liable for oil pollution damage
claims up to $134 per ton or 14 million dollars, whichever
is less. This approach was built into the 1969 Brussels Lia-
bility Convention and was unacceptable to the Canadians. When
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this Liability Convention came to a vote in the 1969 Con-
ference, 34 countries approved, 10 abstained, and Canada alone
cast a dissenting vote. In the words of the Canadian Secretary
of State for External Affairs, Canada was opting for a "Victim
Oriented" law that was designed not to support the ship owner,
but to protect the overwhelming interests of the coastal state
endangered by oil pollution. Canada also abstained from voting
on the Brussels Intervention Convention, claiming that the
reservation which required a marine accident to have "already
occurred" before action could be taken was too severe a limita-
tion. It was again in Canada's view a remedial but not a pre-
ventative proscription. Canada contended that rather than wait
passively for a poorly founded tanker to have a disastrous
accident, the coastal state should be able to impose certain
safety standards or preconditions for tanker entry into poten-
tially hazardous coastal areas.
Canadian concern for marine oil pollution was dramatically
highlighted on 4 February 1970 when the Liberian tanker "Arrow"
went aground on Cerebus Rock in Chedabucto Bay, Nova Scotia,
while enroute from Venezuela with a cargo of 16,000 tons of
bunker C fuel oil. 8 Despite her small size when compared to
the Torrey Canyon, the "Arrow" grounding did cause extensive
pollution damage to several hundred miles of Canadian coast-
line. On 6 February the Ministry of Transport invoked the
anti-pollution provisions of the newly amended Canada Shipping
15
Act and ordered the tanker and her cargo destroyed. 9 The
Canada Shipping Act at that time did not provide for recovery
of pollution damages although it did give the Canadian govern-
ment the authority to take remedial action inside its terri-
torial waters necessary to limit damage. Cost of the required
clean-up was estimated to exceed $3 million. The owners of
"Arrow" were able to respond to damage claims under an existing
voluntary international agreement, but only to the amount of
$1.2 million.
The Arrow incident and the planned 1970 experimental
Arctic Voyage of the U.S. tanker Manhatten convinced Canadian
authorities that additional comprehensive marine pollution
legislation was needed. This legislation would be designed
to overcome all of Canadian reservations with respect to the
Brussels Conventions. In particular, Canadian representatives
to the Brussels Conference had advocated an International
Pollution Convention which would regulate not only petroleum
pollutants but all forms of potential marine pollutants. Can-
ada's first move was taken on 7 April 1970 when her U.N. rep-
resentative made written declaration that Canada would no
longer be bound by the compulsory jurisdiction of the Inter-
national Court of Justice in any matters concerning "the pre-
vention or control of pollution or contamination of the marine
environment in areas adjacent to the coast of Canada.,,10 On
the following day, Bill C-202, An Act to Prevent Pollution of
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Areas of the Arctic Waters Adjacent to the Mainland and Islands
of the Canadian Arctic and Bill C-203, An Act to Amend the
Territorial Sea and Fishing Zones Act were introduced in the
Canadian Parliament. Both bills subsequently became Canadian
Law and have stirred considerable international controversy.11
Bill C-202, later entitled Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention
Act, asserted Canadian jurisdiction for purposes of pollution
prevention to all waters up to 100 nautical miles from every
point of Canadian land above the sixtieth parallel of north
latitude. Subsequent implementing regulations by way of amend-
ment to the Canada Shipping Act (and others) regulate vessel
construction standards, safety features required, qualification
of master and navigator, navigational equipment, routing re-
quirements, etc. It is in all respects a very comprehensive
law -- for instance, "waste" is defined as:
any substance that if added to any waters would
degrade or alter or form a part of a process of
degradation or alteration of the quality of those
waters to an extent that is detrimental to their
use by man or by animal, fish or plant that is
useful to man and any water that contains a sub-
stance in such a quantity or concentration, or
that has been so treated, processed or changed
by heat or other means, from a natural state that
it would, if added to any waters, degrade or alter
or form a process of degradation or alteration of
the quality of those waters to an extent that is
detrimental to their use by man or by any animal,
fish or plant that is useful to man. 1 2
Further absolute liability is the standard applied. Lia-
bi1ity for damages resulting from disposal of wastes in the
Arctic is extended to:
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a. Any person who is engaged in exploring for
or exploiting any natural resource on any
land adjacent to Arctic waters or in any sub-
marine area subadjacent to the Arctic waters.
b. Any person who carries on any undertaking on
the mainland or islands of the Canadian Arctic
or in the Arctic waters.
c. The owner of any ship that navigates within
the Arctic waters and the owner or owners of
the cargo of any such ship.
These persons are liable for all costs and expenses incurred
by the government in preventing, correcting or repairing any
resultant pollution of the Arctic
and
for all actual loss or damage incurred by any other persons.
Any of the individuals engaged in the Arctic as above
described must also furnish evidence of financial responsi-
bility.
The Governor in Council may establish what are termed
Shipping Safety Control Zones within the 100 mile radius pre-
viously mentioned. In these Shipping Safety Control Zones
the most complete control of transitting shipping is exercised.
The regulations for this control of shipping cover hull and
fuel tank construction, construction of propulsion and auxiliary
machinery, steering and propulsion control equipment, the man-
ning of the ship, maximum quantity and stowage of potentially
hazardous materials or cargo, the ship's maximum freeboard,
and the types and quantity of charts, tide tables and other
navigational documentation to be carried.
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The law further specifies the qualification and authority
of implementing officials designated as'~ollution Prevention
Officers."
With the passage of the Act to Amend the Territorial Sea
and Fishing Zones Act, similar anti-pollution authority was
extended to cover Canada's now widened territorial waters.
What is the basis for u.s. objection to the Canadian
approach to preserving the fragile environment of the Arctic?
Certainly little doubt exists that the Arctic environment is
of a rather special and delicate nature and demands protection.
The U.S. objection is not based on what would be achieved in
terms of environmental protection, but rather hinges on Canada's
unilateral assertion of jurisdiction over portions of oceanic
real estate outside of her territorial waters. This unilateral
exercise of jurisdiction over areas of the high seas is not
in conformity with Article 2 of the Geneva Convention on the
High Seas which states:
The high seas being open to all nations, no state
may validly purport to subject any part of them
to its sovereignty.
The u.S. published statement on the Canadian Arctic Waters
Pollution Prevention Act went on to say:
The enactment and implementation of these measures
would affect the exercise by the United States and
other countries of the right to freedom of the seas
in large areas of the high seas and would adversely
affect our efforts to reach international agreement
on the use of the seas. International law provides
no basis for these proposed unilateral extensions of
jurisdiction on the high seas, and the United States
can neither accept nor acquiesce in the assertion of
such jurisdiction. 1 3
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Canada on the other hand by way of rebuttal made a
detailed reply covering many of the reasons which prompted
Canada to take positive steps to prevent pollution of the
Canadian Arctic waters. She made critical comment concerning
several instances where, in the Canadian view, the U.S. had
failed to conform to its own strict interpretation of freedom
of the high seas. Allusion was made to the U.S. 1935 claim
of authority to extend customs enforcement out to 62 miles,
the U.S. establishment of exclusive fishery zones outside its
own 3 mile territorial sea and its recently passed legislation
asserting exclusive pollution control jurisdiction out to 12
miles. Canada was particularly critical of the U.S. unilateral
interferences with the freedom of the high seas during nuclear
tests which appropriated to u.S. use vast areas of the Pacific
Ocean and could have constituted a grave peril to those who
might use such areas during a test. The most significant com-
mentary however was the statement that any danger to the
environment of a state was a threat to its national security.
From this standpoint the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention
Act was based on overriding and internationally recognized
right of self-defense. The other linch pin in the Canadian
argument was that "it is a well established principle of inter-
national law that customary international law is developed by
state practice." l 4 Canada cites as an outstanding example of
state practice later accepted as international law, the 1945
20
Truman Proclamation announcing the U.S. claim to jurisdiction
over their continental shelf.
In terms of bulk oil shipping, the Canadian law has yet
to be tested although the law is being applied to those involved
in Arctic oil exploration and exploitation. l S The Canada Ship-
ping Act has been amended and any commercial shipping in the
Canadian Arctic will certainly be affected. Large scale
exploration is being conducted in the Canadian Arctic by Amer-
ican, Canadian, British, French and German oil interests. 1 6 It
is only a matter of time before the volume of proven oil reserves
makes large scale shipment of Arctic oil a reality.
21
CHAPTER IV
ENDS VERSUS MEANS -- A PROPOSAL
The Brussels Conventions have been emulated in national
anti-pollution legislation by several states including the
United States. l Both NATO and the United States have strongly
advocated a total ban on tanker flushing at sea by 1975. 2
There exists little doubt that considering the ever increasing
world need for oil, massive and irreparable damage will be done
to the marine environment unless drastic worldwide corrective
action is taken now. Then one must ask, why all the furor over
Canada's attempt to protect the Arctic which is surely in her
national and equally in the world's international best interests
The complaint voiced does not concern Canada's objectives, but
her unilateral method of achieving those worthy objectives.
If the international community including the U.S. would look
at this impasse in that dual light, a plausible course of actio
suggests itself. Agree (even with several reservations) that
state action does (or has historically) create a precedent or
basis for future international law.
The Arctic is a fine example of an area where much valu-
able experience could be gained by attempting to implement a
new and more stringent anti-pollution law. The Antarctic was
after all the subject of an innovative international agreement
which allows many nations to work in harmony largely because
22

no single national sovereignty is exercised there. Take a
similar tack in the Arctic except on a regional basis involv-
ing all countries which are contiguous with or lie north of
the Arctic circle. There are two possibilities implicit here.
The Canadian Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act or an
agreed modification thereof could be adopted by an Arctic
Regional body for implementation on a trial basis. The two
biggest Arctic states, Russia and Canada, are in quite remark-
able agreement already on measures needed to protect the Arctic
Ocean. This step would remove the somewhat artificial stigma
of being a unilateral solution and allow a more objective trial
of specific regulations.
The next step would be to have each Arctic state imple-
ment the Canadian plan (or mutually acceptable variation) in
their respective Arctic waters area as an agent of the United
Nations. We've certainly had many a U.N. Peace Keeping Force
in the past, why not a U.N. sponsored Environmental Protection
Group for the Arctic? Any new body of law is bound to need to
be modified based on operational experience. The model when
well adapted to the strict environmental demands of the Arctic
could prove a good point of departure for a worldwide and truly
international marine environmental protective regime. Certainly
such a comprehensive marine regime is needed and will ultim-
ately evolve. Why not capitalize on an opportunity to learn
in an area not presently trammeled by generations of commercial
23
usage, custom, and political bias? The U.S. original note
of protest mentioned an intention to invite interested states
to join in an international conference designed to establish
rules for proper management of the Arctic beyond national
jurisdiction. It is strongly suggested that the 1972 Stockholm
Conference on the Human Environment would be a good opportunity
to tender this belated invitation.
The regional and ultimately international nature of marine
environmental protection stems from two quite practical consid-
erations. First, marine pollution is not noticeably subject
to national boundaries. Second, it is one thing to write com-
prehensive regulatory legislation for a wide ocean area--it's
quite another matter to enforce this legislation in an effective
manner. The resources alone needed to patrol the approaches to
Arctic shipping lanes and prevent or regulate entry or other-
wise implement the Canadian law may become too much of a
national burden. It's no problem at the moment because large
scale bulk oil shipping has yet to begin. All indications are
that volume shipping through Arctic waters is not too far off.
In this connection it is worthy of note that the Canadian govern-
ment has recognized the importance of enhancing their polar
icebreaking capabilities and have evidenced considerable inter-
est in learning from recent Arctic patrol experiences of other
northern countries. In April of last year the Canadian govern-
ment (House of Commons Standing Committee on Indian Affairs
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and Northern Development) appropriated funds to gain expert
advice on polar icebreakers from Wartsila Shipyard, Helsinki,
Finland. A quite detailed study was made of the legal rela-
tionship between Canadian icebreaker capacity and Canadian
assertion of jurisdiction in Arctic waters. The entire com-
mit tee discussion brought out quite clearly that no matter how
control was exercised, i.e., by whatever vehicle, effective
control was central to the credibility of the Canadian Arctic
Pollution Prevention legislation. 3 In the minutes of this
House of Commons committee meeting were related the generally
sympathetic responses of several Arctic and Northern European
countries to the Canadian initiative on the Arctic environment.
To varying degrees their only reservations involved the uni-
lateral nature of Canadian action.
The patrol of the entire Arctic Ocean approaches in the
event of large scale oil shipment would be an immense under-
taking. In the view of many it would pose too much of a finan-
cial burden for Canada alone. All the more argument for a
regional approach. The present International Ice Patrol would
offer an excellent administrative and organizational model
from which there would be available a wealth of operational
experience. Beside the obvious cost of operating an oversized
Arctic Coast Guard, the matter of funding oil spill prevention
and/or clean up costs is a big consideration. The Canadian
goal of full and absolute liability for all pollution damage
25
Are such large
Certainly the
involves a tremendous financial capability.
amounts available for anti-pollution funding?
funds are available if one takes a hard look at the economics
of the bulk oil shipping industry. The new economics of the
giant tanker provides enormous profits. For instance, in 1970
the voyage charter of a Norwegian 100,000 deadweight ton tanker
from the Persian Gulf to Great Britain brought a freight rate
of $19.00 per ton with owner's total operating costs of only
$2.40 per ton. In the same year a smaller tanker of 40,000
tons was purchased for $2 million. She was paid for in twelve
months, plus a net profit of $3 million. 4 Operating costs de-
crease markedly as tanker size increases. A 250,000 DWT tanker
cost about $20 million in 1970. One such tanker on a three
year charter at $3.70 per ton per month realized gross earnings
of over $34 million. 5 So the money's there; it's a matter of
equitable distribution again. We have for years looked upon
the marine environment as a free good of inexhaustible quality
and at no cost to the user. It is becoming rapidly apparent
that such an externality must be resolved in favor of mankind.
A viable environment is an absolute necessity for human sur-
vival; therefore, it cannot be used nor abused without cost.
The user must pay a reasonable price for its profitable use of
the oceans. This being the case, it seems futile to fault
Canada too heavily for attempting to gain a needed head start
on a serious problem of recognized authenticity and global
consequence. It is no longer an argument of whether the ends
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justify the means, but a question of adopting valid coastal
state objectives and methods by a regional and/or an inter-
national authority.
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CHAPTER V
WHAT REMAINS -- A PREDICTION
A great deal of change in marine oil pollution law has
occurred since the 1920's and the passage of the British Oil
in Navigable Waters Act of 1922 and the U.S. Oil Pollution Act
of 1924. Indeed these laws were the first modern day attempts
by a sovereign state to acquire legal competence in this field.
We have seen also that the nature of this legal competence has
undergone a significant change. Initially the coastal state
had a limited legal ability to take remedial action concerning
marine oil pollution, but strictly within its territorial waters.
As time progressed this legal authority has been increased to
allow preventative action by a coastal state as distinguished
from purely after-the-fact remedial efforts. This increased
coastal state competence to prevent as well as correct marine
oil pollution has in certain specific circumstances been ex-
tended to include a national competence outside of territorial
waters. The three foundations of this increased legal compe-
tence are the 1969 Amendment to the London Oil Pollution Con-
vention of 1954 and the two 1969 Brussels Conventions, the
Intervention Convention, and the Liability Convention previously
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discussed.* The strict and methodical application of the
provisions of these three international conventions will pro-
vide the coastal state with a very considerably enhanced capa-
bility to deal with marine oil pollution. All three however
have not as yet been brought into universal force for lack of
sufficient national ratifications. The delay in U.S. ratifi-
cation was evidently the result of attempting to resolve certain
differences between the Brussels Conventions and existing
national legislation. On 20 May 1970, President Nixon trans-
It is instructive
mitted the two Brussels Conventions and the 1969 Amendment to
the London Oil Pollution Convention to the Senate for their
advice and consent. l Prior to that date however, President
Nixon signed the Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970 which
sharply increased penalties for oil spills. 2
to note that two of the major strengths of the Brussels Con-
ventions have been incorporated in this piece of national
legislation. The new law specifies that strict liability will
prevail, that is proof of negligence is not a factor. It also
raised the clean-up bill from a maximum of $5 million or $67.00
per gross ton to a maximum of $14 million or $100.00 per gross
*The formal title of these Brussels Conventions are:
"International Convention Relating to Intervention on the High
Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties," sometimes referred
to as the Public Convention, and "International Convention on
Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage," sometimes referred
to as the Private Convention.
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ton whichever is less. This latter amount is taken directly
from the provisions of the Brussels Liability Convention.
With the ratification of the three conventions and adjustment
of national legislation to suit coastal states will acquire
a greatly increased competence to handle marine oil pollution
effectively. But are these three Conventions and resulting
national legislation sufficient to the need? Obviously Canada
feels that a greater coastal state competence is required at
least in the Arctic. There exists a wealth of credible scien-
tific research that lends considerable weight to the Canadian
contention that an oil spill in the Arctic is vastly more
serious than one in a moderate climate. The greatest hazard
stems from the slow rate of biological decomposition of crude
oil at extremely low temperatures. Dr. R.E. Warner, Professor
of Biology at the Memorial University of Newfoundland, reported
the following in a paper prepared for the Canadian Wildlife
Service:
The decomposition rate of crude oil slows markedly
at lower temperatures, and at 0° centigrade is
drastically reduced, some components of the process
stopping altogether. Decomposition in the Arctic
Ocean whose temperatures are at 0° centigrade or
below would be very slow indeed. Where crude oil
is exposed to still lower temperatures, biochemical
decay would be virtually nonexistent and the oil
would persist for decades, perhaps centuries. 3
There is an obvious internal conflict of interests in this
Canadian situation. It is certainly in the Canadian best inter-
ests to develop the tremendous economic potential implicit in
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the vast mineral reserves of the Arctic. On the other hand
she must, in the long run, see to the proper protection of
this very fragile hinterland. What will be the ultimate reso-
1ution of this dilemma and how will it affect the worldwide
legal problem of marine pollution?
In my research and in correspondence and conversation
with Canadian, British and U.S. officials, I am convinced that
the Canadian position is honestly stated. Canada does not
want to persist in a unilateral defensive posture any longer
than is, in her view, absolutely necessary. However she will
not abdicate her responsibility to protect the Arctic, which
in the words of Prime Minister Trudeau, "is the most signifi-
cant surface area of the globe for it controls the temperature
of much of the Northern Hemisphere • Its continued exis-
tence in unspoiled form is vital to all mankind.,,4 There are
strong pressures being exerted by several world powers to
develop the Arctic, particularly its large oil reserves. It
is my contention that the resultant of these two forces, to
develop and to protect, will if properly handled provide that
"accommodation of interest" so frequently mentioned in Canadian
writings on this subject.* This accommodation to which Canadian
*Mr. J.A. Beesley, Legal Advisor to the Canadian Depart-
ment of External Affairs, commented "we are not so much
interested in gaining international acquiescence to our
(Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act) policy as we are in
seeking an accommodation of interest between coastal states
and shipping states or other countries which might be using
Arctic waters."
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authorities refer could, and I believe will, take one of
these forms:
1. greater recognition of the Arctic as being somewhat
different from a freely navigable, essentially oceanic high
seas to which all the freedoms of the high seas may not be
strictly applicable. 5
2. a greater tendency amongst Arctic coastal states to
express a coherent Arctic protection policy which will be much
in line with the present Canadian viewpoint. This is already
apparent in recent Canadian-Russian discussions. 6
3. and finally the need for Arctic oil, its abundance and
its nearness to prime markets (particularly u.s. and Japan) will
result in the development of surface or submarine tankers which
will satisfy the safety requirements of existing Canadian
law.7, 8
In support of the above contentions it should be noted
that the Canadians are making detailed and carefully orchestra-
ted preparations for the forthcoming United Nations Conference
on the Human Environment which is to begin in Stockholm on
5 June 1972. The Secretary General of this U.N. sponsored
Environmental Conference is Mr. Maurice Strong, an influential
Canadian business executive and until recently, President of
the Canadian International Development Agency. It is only
reasonable to assume that given this controlling position, the
Canadian preparations to promote their viewpoint will be char-
acterized by thoroughness, imagination and persuasion. By
32
comparison I have been unable to discover any similarly
cohesive preparation to articulate the U.S. view on the control
of marine pollution. This impression is exemplified by the
Chairman of the British Royal Advisory Committee on Oil Pol-
lution of the Sea, Lord Wayland Kennet, who made the following
comment concerning U. S. preparations: liThe United States
rumbles forward, divided between pros and antis to the very
top, issuing contradictory statements from every vent, but on
the whole more committed to the success of the Stockholm Con-
ference than not." 9
At any rate, I am concerned that the Canadian viewpoint
appears to be better staffed for worldwide presentation than
does our own. If we wish to influence events at Stockholm
we would appear to have considerable homework yet to be accom-
plished.
Having examined the legal competence of the coastal state
to deal with marine oil pollution at some length, what will
be the ultimate result of coastal state influence on the
development of international law? I would conclude by making
the following predictions for international marine pollution
law development in the 1970's:
a. The Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment
will have a greater than anticipated positive affect on the
strengthening of existing conventions on marine pollution.
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b. Necessary ratifications will be forthcoming within
a year to place the two 1969 Brussels Conventions and the 1969
London Amendment into force.
c. The 1969 Brussels Resolution concerning the establish-
ment of an International Compensation Fund for Oil Pollution
Damage will be implemented. Constructive and successful efforts
will be made by IMCO to include later provision for coverage
concerning marine pollutants other than oil.
d. International action will result in the total prohi-
bition of the discharge of oil into any part of the high seas
except as the result of an "act of God ll or under IIForce Majeure ll
circumstances.
e. There will occur international acceptance of a Regional
Arctic Marine Pollution regime that is virtually identical to
the present Canadian concept.
f. There will be established under United Nations auspices
an International Environmental Protection Agency competent to
deal with all forms of marine pollution.
State practice does to a considerable degree affect the
future formulation of international law. The well documented
and persuasively articulated coastal state's concern with the
protection of her own marine environment will certainly have a
positive influence on the development of international environ-
mental law.
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